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ABSTRACT 
 
An Experimental Investigation of Age Discrimination 
in the English Labor Market 
 
Carefully-matched pairs of written job applications were made to test for age discrimination in 
hiring. A twenty-one year-old and a thirty-nine year-old woman applied for jobs where a “new 
graduate” was sought; men aged twenty-seven and forty-seven, inquired about employment 
as waiters; women aged twenty-seven and forty-seven, inquired about employment in retail 
sales. The rate of net discrimination against the older graduate, and against the older waiters 
in their London inquiries, correspond to the highest rates ever recorded anywhere, by written 
tests, for racial discrimination. There was a statistically significant preference for the older 
applicant in retail sales. 
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  “He looks old to be a waiter” (White Teeth) 
I. Introduction 
The growing interest in field experiments, as a method of empirical investigation in 
economics, is demonstrated by the special issue of The BE Journal of Economic 
Analysis and Policy (Advances), (2006, 6, issue 2) which is dedicated to field 
experiments. The first field experiment of discrimination in employment, which used 
pairs of matched, written job applications, was undertaken in the 1960s by Jowell and 
Prescott-Clarke (1970). They developed the technique to investigate racial 
discrimination in employment in England. The first time this experimental method 
was applied to investigate sexual discrimination in employment was in Melbourne 
during the 1980s (Riach and Rich 1987). The measurement of discrimination by 
making matched, written job applications has been received with approbation in the 
academic journals, for example - in a survey of evidence on discrimination, Darity and 
Mason stated “This (correspondence testing) is impressive direct evidence of 
discrimination from a powerful test procedure” (Darity and Mason 1998, p. 81). 
 
Although it originated almost forty years ago, there has been virtually no application 
of this technique to measuring the extent of age discrimination in employment. This is 
surprising, given the widespread contemporary concern about the economic 
implications of the ageing population in Western countries, and the frequent 
recommendation that the only viable solution to the consequent “pensions’ crisis” is 
an extended working life. For example the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), referring to the United Kingdom - “… in 2050, for every 
person over the age of 65, there will be only 2.1 individuals of working age compared 
to 3.7 in 2003” (OECD 2004, p. 36). The British Government’s response to this 
impending demographic difficulty came in a Green Paper issued in 2002 by the 
Department of Work and Pensions; Simplicity, security and choice: Working and 
saving for retirement. Amongst other observations it included; “Increasing 
employment among older workers is essential if we are to address the pensions 
challenge. Working longer can dramatically reduce the rate at which people need to 
save for their retirement” (Department for Work and Pensions 2002, Cmd. 5677, p. 93 
- emphasis added). 
 
It is the case, though, that there is a significant challenge in applying the experimental 
technique to age discrimination; this is the obvious variation in human capital across 
the generations. The logic of this experimental technique, as innovated by Jowell and 
Prescott Clarke, is to design the test so as to control strictly for human capital 
components such as education, qualifications, skills and experience, and so that the 
only distinguishing feature of the two job applicants is the characteristic, such as race 
or sex, which is being tested. The influence of race or sex on hiring decisions is 
consequently isolated. In the case of age there must inevitably be a variation in the job 
experience of the different age groups, and therefore a difficulty in determining 
whether any employment preference is attributable to a profit-maximizing response to 
differential human capital or to prejudice. The one economist who has applied the 
technique to age, Bendick (1996 and 1999), attempted to deal with this issue by 
having older applicants who had spent 25 years in some unrelated activity, such as 
child-raising, military service or public school teaching, which generated no relevant 
experience for the employment being tested. This is a highly artificial construct and 
leads to uncertainties; for instance, do employers rate experience between ages 40 and 
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50 as equivalent to experience between ages 25 and 35? Also it is not a realistic basis 
for policy development as virtually no older workers fit such a pattern.  
 
In our paper “Field Experiments of Discrimination in the Market-Place” (Riach and 
Rich 2002) we recommended that instead of adapting job applicants to the technique, 
the technique should be adapted to the special case of older applicants. In other words, 
to accept that the job experience component of human capital does vary between 
different groups and have realistic candidates make applications, but to control for all 
other dimensions of human capital.  
 
A frequent accusation against older applicants is that they are less mentally 
able/flexible and less physically active than their youthful competitors; “… numerous 
surveys and research conducted in the past 15 years point to negative employer 
perceptions vis-à-vis older workers with respect to their productivity, cost, work 
motivation, health, receptiveness towards training and ability to cope with 
technological and organisational change” (OECD 2004, p. 97; see also Purcell et al. 
2003, pp. 3-4). However the objective scientific literature is to the contrary; “The 
finding from more than 100 research investigations is that there is no significant 
difference between the job performance of older and younger workers” (Warr 1994, p. 
309).  
 
We decided to confront such ageist attitudes by presenting older applicants who were 
not more than forty-seven, who were engaged in strenuous physical activity, such as 
competitive squash and cycling, and who demonstrated mental flexibility by an up-to-
date interest in computers and information technology. In other words we controlled 
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for the older candidate’s mental and physical capacities, but not for their length of 
experience. In which case, if a preference were found for younger applicants with 
twenty years less experience, it would indicate a very significant level of prejudice 
against older applicants. On the other hand, if we were to find a preference for the 
older workers in such circumstances it could be interpreted as an economically 
rational response to human capital superiority, rather than prejudice against youth. 
The OECD recognises that; “…age discrimination is neither overt nor easily 
measured” (OECD 2004, p. 98). This is a challenge which we now address; what 
follows is the first realistic attempt to measure age discrimination by using the 
experimental technique of forwarding matched, written applications.  
 
2. The experiment 
The intention was to have pairs of job applicants who were carefully-matched in all 
respects except in the experience which inevitably goes with age. An implication of 
this approach is that jobs with a career hierarchy were ruled out of the investigation. 
For instance, academics in their mid-twenties would be applying for different posts to 
those in their mid-forties: the former would be applying for post-doctoral fellowships 
or lectureships, whilst the latter would be applying for Chairs or Deanships. This is 
not to say that age discrimination may not be alive and well in academia, or in law, or 
in the civil service, but instead that it cannot be investigated by the technique of paired 
mail applications. We have chosen occupations where it is realistic to expect that 
applications will come from candidates aged twenty years apart. 
 
There are two techniques for applying this experimental method. The first is to 
respond to advertized vacancies, as innovated by Jowell and Prescott-Clarke in 1969, 
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and surveyed by Riach and Rich (2002). The second is to conduct the investigation by 
forwarding unsolicited job inquiries to a group of employers in some occupation, as 
innovated by Fidell in 1970 and surveyed by Riach and Rich (2004b). The former 
procedure confronts the employer with simultaneous pairs of fictitious job 
applications at a time when he/she has initiated recruitment and they will be dealt with 
during the normal hiring process, but the application and observation rate, and 
therefore the duration of the study, is dependent on the state of the labor market. The 
latter procedure is more expedient; all that is required is an appropriate listing of 
employers in a particular occupation, and two mailings about a month apart, if the 
intention is to test matched pairs and if suspicion on the part of employers is to be 
allayed. This procedure is more appropriate in occupations where inquiries are 
customarily initiated from the supply side and in small business, so ensuring the 
inquiry is likely to be answered by the same person who normally takes hiring 
decisions. As inquiries must arrive at least a month apart there is some randomness in 
the extent to which they will coincide with a vacancy, therefore there can be less 
expectation of “equivalent treatment” (both candidates being offered interviews) than 
with the first procedure. Nevertheless, if in the first mailing fifty per cent of inquiries 
go from candidate A and fifty per cent from candidate B, with reversal in the 
following month, this variation in timing will not bias the overall outcome of the 
experiment: i.e. there is control by age for the timing of application receipt. 
 
We decided to apply both techniques in this study. In England we applied to 
advertized vacancies for new graduates in those positions where a “degree in general” 
was the prerequisite for employment, rather than any specific degree. Vacancies were 
obtained from the Saturday Guardian and from various web-sites 
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(www.jobs.guardian.co.uk; www.topjobs.co.uk; www.monster.co.uk). Entry into the 
profession of Chartered Accountancy is by application to an authorised training firm, 
consequently such firms expect to receive, without advertisement, a steady flow of 
inquiries. We also had our new graduates apply to all such firms in England.  One of 
our new graduates was female and aged twenty-one; the other was female and aged 
thirty-nine i.e. an individual euphemistically designated in Britain as a “mature age” 
graduate. The latter applicant had worked for eleven years as a secretary and spent 
five years in full-time child-rearing before entering university. She was divorced with 
a child of ten to indicate that pregnancy was likely to be a thing of the past. 
 
We chose this area of employment because of its contemporary relevance; in 2002/03 
there were 95,590 female students over thirty in English universities (20.4 percent of 
total students) and the universities actively recruit this age group (Higher Education 
Statistics Agency 2002/03, unpublished data). An additional reason for targeting a 39 
year-old applicant was to explore the possibility of obtaining some experimental 
confirmation of the survey evidence which suggests that age discrimination can 
impact at a quite early age; e.g. “In a survey of over 1000 people the Chartered 
Institute of Personnel and Development found that … 1 in 4 think that employers are 
not interested in employing people over age 40” (Third Age Employment Network  
2003). In 1996 a survey of employers found evidence that age discrimination started at 
42 (Penna Sanders and Sidney 2002).  
 
 In an experimental investigation of age discrimination, for the reasons discussed 
above, it is not possible strictly to alternate the résumés, as is done in race and sex 
experiments, but in all non age-related characteristics the résumés of “new graduates” 
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were alternated. In half the applications the older applicant was a law graduate from X 
and in the other half she was an economics graduate from Y. We could not use the 
names of genuine educational institutions or employers in the résumés for two 
reasons. First there is the risk of detection if an employer were to make direct contact 
with a genuine company or university falsely cited in a résumé. Secondly an 
educational institution might take legal redress against a party falsely claiming to 
possess one of its awards. We decided to deal with this difficulty by inventing 
fictitious universities and employers. Just such an approach had been adopted in the 
International Labour Office’s investigation of racial discrimination in the German 
labor market: fictitious schools and universities were invented (Goldberg et al. 1996). 
There are approximately one hundred universities in Britain and all but a handful have 
locational names; either of a city or a county. We therefore chose an English city and 
county which did not have universities, but which quite plausibly might, and used 
them in the résumés of our “new graduates”. There was a flood of new universities in 
the decade prior to these tests. In 1992 twenty polytechnics became universities with 
names like De Montfort, South Bank, Liverpool John Moores and London Guildhall. 
Since then there has been a steady trickle of additions with Chichester, Southampton 
Solent and Thames Valley amongst those acquiring universities. If counties such as 
Hertfordshire and Staffordshire have universities why might not Herefordshire and 
Shropshire? If towns like Loughborough, Bournemouth and Brighton have 
universities is it not conceivable that Ipswich and Salisbury have universities? We 
therefore believe that employers recruiting graduates would be unlikely to have a 
definitive knowledge of the current list of universities. In the case of current and 
former employers we simply specified their field of activity, such as merchant 
banking or chartered surveying. University careers officers and a Course Leader in 
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Business Studies provided advice on the personal profiles used for the graduates’ 
résumés, and their realism and efficacy is confirmed by the fact that we did obtain 
responses from very large firms and major recruitment agencies. 
 
Cultural and sporting interests were chosen to be interchangeable because of the 
practice of reversing résumés. They were also deliberately chosen to suggest that the 
older applicant had no stereo-typical ageist traits; the interchangeable interests 
included classical and contemporary dance, playing squash and language classes. 
 
We sent unsolicited inquiries about possible job openings for male waiters to four 
hundred and seventy hotels and restaurants throughout England (two hundred and 
twenty in London and two hundred and fifty across the rest of the country). One 
applicant was twenty-seven and the other was forty-seven. We chose this area of 
employment because it is one where supply-side inquiries are customary, and because 
it is an area of small business where any inquiry is likely to find its way to those who 
normally take the hiring decision.  
 
 It was not possible to perform any reversal of résumés in this case as, unlike our “new 
graduate” applicants, the education of waiters could not have been undertaken 
simultaneously. Both candidates had completed year eleven of school, but in the case 
of the older candidate the prevailing award in England was General Certificate of 
Education (GCE) at Ordinary (O) level, whereas in the case of the younger candidate 
it was General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE). Both candidates had 
included English and Mathematics in their awards. In this case we invented fictitious 
restaurant names for current employers. The efficacy of this tactic in particular, and 
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the content of our résumés in general is confirmed by the receipt of positive responses 
from some of London’s most expensive and fashionable restaurants. “Interests” were 
chosen to demonstrate the older applicant’s physical fitness, and capacity to cope with 
modern technology. The “interests” included competitive squash and internet usage; 
also, computing had been studied at evening class. The résumés of waiters were 
prepared in conjunction with advice from the head waiter of a two-star restaurant in 
London. In any one posting half the inquiries went from the older applicant and half 
from the younger, with reversal in the following month. The résumés used for the 
waiters are included in the Appendix. 
  
We used an identical procedure in making inquiries about possible employment in 
three hundred female clothing stores in London In this case one female applicant was 
twenty-seven and the other forty-seven; fictitious names were invented for the retail 
shops where they currently worked as assistant mangers. We chose to include this area 
of employment because it is one of small business, where the inquiry is likely to be 
dealt with by the person who normally takes hiring decisions. An additional reason is 
that there is anecdotal evidence in England that retail sales is an area where some 
employers do deliberately target older workers. The large “do-it-yourself” retailer, 
B&Q, is noted for hiring older employees because of the benefit which their 
experience provides customers.  
 
 Once again, the relevant content of our résumé in general is confirmed by the receipt 
of positive responses from some of London’s more expensive and fashionable retail 
shops and from major High Street chains. A former senior personnel manager of a 
major retail chain advised us on the résumés for this occupation. In this case the 
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“Interests” chosen to demonstrate the older candidate’s physical fitness and mental 
agility were competitive tennis, the internet and learning Italian. Computer usage had 
been pursued at evening class. 
 
The three pairs of English résumés were also vetted by an experienced employment 
consultant who specialises in advising older job applicants. We applied by surface 
mail and cited both an email and postal address for responses. The postal addresses 
were in comparable socio-economic districts of central London, approximately one 
mile apart. We have always been very careful to retain documentation of our research, 
so we were careful to print off applications and replies, so hard copies could be filed. 
Positive responses via email or surface mail were dealt with promptly and courteously 
with a reply explaining that alternative employment had already been secured. 
 
The one publication where the ethical considerations involved in this deceptive 
procedure are dealt with, and compared with research activity in psychology, 
sociology and laboratory-experimental economics, is Riach and Rich (2004a). The 
alternative, non-deceptive, techniques for measuring discrimination have encountered 
difficulties. Surveys of attitudes towards target groups in the labor market are not 
likely to produce honest and accurate responses, as demonstrated by La Piere’s classic 
study. In 1934 he travelled through the USA with a Chinese couple and gained 
admittance to all except one of 241 hotels and restaurants approached. In response to 
questionnaires sent six months later to the same establishments, over 90 per cent 
replied they would not accept Chinese guests. (La Piere 1934) The econometrician’s 
application of regression analysis to published data to deduce discrimination, 
pioneered by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) has been subject to considerable 
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criticism, which revolves around the specification of the model and the choice of 
independent variables; see for example (Gunderson 1989) On the other hand, 
carefully-designed deceptive field experiments can provide an unequivocal measure of 
discrimination.  
 
3. The results 
The outcome of this experiment is set out in Table 1 in a format which follows 
McIntosh and Smith (1974, p. 13) and which has since been adopted in field 
experiments across Europe; e.g. Brown and Gay (1985); Bovenkerk (1992, pp. 26, 31) 
(see Riach and Rich 2002, pp. F486-F491). Column 4 shows the number of occasions 
when one or both applicants received a favorable response; by post, telephone, fax or 
email. This total is divided as follows: column 5 shows occasions when both received 
favorable responses (equal treatment); column 6 shows occasions when only the 
younger received a favorable response (discrimination against the older); and column 
7 shows occasions when only the older received a favorable response (discrimination 
against the younger). Column 8 is net discrimination; that is 7 minus 6, so that it is 
positive when the older applicant encountered more discrimination than the younger 
applicant. The statistical significance of any finding of net discrimination was 
determined by the application of the chi-square test. The data were categorised as 
accepted /rejected for two applicants in a 2*2 contingency table (Riach and Rich 2002, 
pp. F493 – F496). A comparison with British experimental results for race and sex 
discrimination is provided in Table 2. The rate of net discrimination against the older 
graduate applicant of 59.6 percent is one of the highest ever recorded. The highest net 
rate of discrimination ever previously recorded by the written experimental method 
was 66.7 percent against Antilleans in France in 1977 (Riach and Rich 2002, Table 4, 
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p. F500). In view of the encouragement given by government for people to retrain, 
and by universities for mature-age women to enrol, this result is quite disturbing. Our 
older female graduate had an equivalent degree, no greater likelihood of pregnancy 
and one might have thought that her life experience would have enhanced her human 
capital and employability. On the contrary, we had one reply which explained “I 
wanted to be honest with you, our client is looking for recent graduates who are 
looking for their first job. You obviously have substantially more experience than this 
and being honest I feel that it would be a waste of your time to take your application 
any further. Sorry if this sounds harsh but we do believe in being honest with people”. 
(The younger applicant received a positive response: information on the job, and a 
request to complete a maths test and a questionnaire).   
 
We report, in Table 3, the results for the sub-set of graduates, whose applications were 
to employers who possessed the imprimatur of “Investors in People”. The net rate of 
discrimination in the case of these employers was 46.2 percent, which was statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. The Home Page of this organization states; “Investors in 
People Standard is a straightforward, proven framework for delivering business 
improvement through people…” (Investors in People 2005). It also states on the page; 
Recruitment and Selection Model-Any Questions? “The Recruitment and Selection 
Model focuses specifically on good recruitment and selection practices, and how they 
impact on performance”. Apparently some members of Investors in People believe 
that “good recruitment and selection practice” involves discarding applications from 
graduates because they have reached the age of 39.  
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The rate of net discrimination against the 47-year-old waiter in London of 68.2 per 
cent is the highest ever recorded anywhere by the written experimental method. Table 
2 indicates that McIntosh and Smith (1974) recorded a net rate of 30.0 percent for 
West Indians and Jowell and Prescott-Clarke (1970) recorded a rate of 11.0 percent 
for West Indians and 50.0 percent for Indians. Outside London discrimination was at 
the much lower rate of 13.8 percent so that the net rate for England was 28.8 percent. 
 
In the case of retail sales we found a preference for the older applicant, which was 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Although there are no other published experimental studies of age discrimination in 
employment available for comparative purposes, List (2004) has detected age 
discrimination in a product market experiment. He found that white males aged 60 and 
over encountered discrimination when they participated as either buyers or sellers in 
the sportscard market. This reinforces our finding that age discrimination is a serious 
phenomenon and needs to be addressed as vigorously as racial and sexual 
discrimination.  
  
4. Interpretation 
Warr (1994) presents a classification of job activity in four categories, based on the 
relationship of performance to age. First are “age-impaired activities” in which there 
is a negative relationship between age and performance; “… basic capacities are 
exceeded to a greater extent for older people and experience cannot help. Tasks of that 
kind include continuous rapid information processing and some forms of strenuous 
physical activity.” (Warr 1994, p. 314) “... complex tasks, requiring a large number or 
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processing steps, are especially likely to be susceptible to cognitive slowing” (Warr 
1994, p. 315). Second are “age-counteracted activities”, in which there is no 
relationship between age and performance, because older people have strategies to 
compensate for any decline in information processing skills or in physical capacity. 
For example “…middle managers may learned to conserve their energy and time by 
operating through day-to- day tactics which reduce cognitive and affective load” 
(Warr 1994, p. 317). Third are “age-neutral activities”, in which there is no 
relationship between age and performance, because the work is relatively 
undemanding and routine “...primary memory is apparently unaffected by age; older 
people are as able as their younger counterparts to hold in memory small amounts of 
information that are being used in uncomplicated cognitive activities” (Warr 1994, p. 
317). Fourth are “age-enhanced activities” in which performance improves with age, 
because of the favorable impact of experience. Knowledge-based activity without time 
pressure comes within this category. For example; “… in a study of an American 
company’s sales staff older employees were rated much more positively than younger 
ones in almost every respect” (Warr 1994, p. 316). 
 
Warr’s framework provides an explanation for age-related employment preferences 
which arise from age-related human capital differences. Becker and Arrow/Phelps 
have provided the economic bases for employment preferences which arise from 
discriminatory attitudes in the market place. Becker’s (1971) theory proposes that 
customers, employers and/or current employees will sacrifice economic benefit, in 
order to indulge a “taste” for eschewing contact with some perceived pariah group. 
The Arrow/Phelps (1973/1972) hypothesis of “statistical discrimination” refers to the 
incomplete information, which employers have of the productivity and work 
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characteristics of individual job applicants; this induces employers to resort to 
generalisations about the employment characteristics of groups, as a screening device 
to minimise the cost of information acquisition in the hiring process. 
 
In the case of “new graduates”, where we found a very high rate of discrimination 
against the older job applicant, it is not realistic to explain it by attribution to Warr’s 
first category; the older graduate is 39, and has just completed a degree in a rigorous 
discipline: economics or law. Also she engages in squash or contemporary dance, and 
learns Italian. It is difficult to credit that discrimination is “statistical” in the sense 
defined by Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972). Both the “new graduate” women are in 
the fertile age range and, theoretically, equally prone to employment interruption, 
although the age of the older candidate’s child might indicate she had done with 
planned child-bearing. The nature of this employment is that employee-customer 
contact is minimal to moderate, so it is unlikely that employers are being driven by 
any customer pressure; instead a clue might be found in the reply quoted above; 
delayed entry into higher education and experience of work being viewed as a 
disadvantage, as it might have imparted confidence, self-assurance and a degree of 
independence which could make life difficult for low-level managers, i.e. a variant of 
employer discrimination à la Becker (1971). Some confirmation of this hypothesis 
was found when graduates were interviewed about their experience of job search; “… 
some employers appear to have regarded mature graduates with suspicion, not only 
unsure about where they might fit into an organisation, but also wary of their motives 
for doing a degree and imputing character flaws in those who had not followed the 
“normal” (in fact middle-class) educational route from secondary school into higher 
education” (Purcell et al. 2003, p. 26).  
 15
Waiters clearly come into Warr’s category three, as the work is relatively 
undemanding and routine; also recall that our older waiter plays competitive squash, 
so his physical capacity to do the job can hardly be in doubt. The contrasting finding 
between London and the rest of England rules out “statistical discrimination”; it is not 
realistic to hypothesise that any constituents of incomplete information vary 
geographically, in such a way as to activate this reaction. As long ago as 1933 George 
Orwell in Down and Out in Paris and London, (1940, pp. 68-69) recognized the 
strange symbiosis between waiter and diner. It certainly is an occupation with a 
critical interaction between employee and customer, and in an economic activity 
where repeat business is vital for commercial success. There is critical interaction, for 
instance, between nurse and patient, but few of us are repeat customers of hospitals. 
This might suggest particular insight in the casual aside quoted at the outset of this 
paper, which comes from the television adaptation of Zadie Smith’s novel White 
Teeth, that is, customer prejudice à la Becker. 
 
In their econometric study, which used data from the Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey, Daniel and Heywood found “…strong evidence for the role of 
deferred compensation and internal labor markets as a negative predictor of hiring 
older workers. This fits the hypothesis that efficient life-time incentive structures 
require hiring younger workers and employing them when old, but not hiring older 
workers.” (Daniel and Heywood 2007, p. 49). However these factors cannot explain 
our results for graduates and waiters. Waiters do not operate in internal labor markets, 
nor do they benefit from deferred compensation. Our older graduate is 39, whereas 
Daniel and Heywood distinguish between those under 50, and those who are 50 or 
over. With more than twenty years until retirement our mature age graduate hardly fits 
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the hypothesis that - “… the firm does not hire older workers because their shorter 
employment horizon means they are less well motivated by delayed compensation” 
(Daniel and Heywood 2007, p. 37). 
 
The geographical variation between London and the rest of England is unprecedented 
in this type of experimental research. It may be partly explained by differential 
unemployment rates: for the period of this experiment (July-September 2004) the 
Labour Force Survey records a rate of 7.2 percent for men in London, in contrast to a 
rate of 4.4 percent for the rest of England (Labour Market Statistics 2005). When 
unemployment is high, and more applicants are searching, it facilitates the exercise of 
any discriminatory penchant which employers may have. Conversely when 
unemployment is low, and fewer applicants are searching, employers have less 
opportunity to discard applicants simply on the basis of some arbitrary characteristic 
such as race, sex or age. The higher rate for London may also be partly attributable to 
a greater devotion to pursuit of the fashionable “celebrity lifestyle” in the 
cosmopolitan capital, with its emphasis on the “youth culture”, which reflects the 
younger age distribution of the London population. The proportion of the Inner 
London population aged 20-39 in 2001 was 41.3 percent; the proportion of the 
population in that age range for the rest of England was 27.5 percent (Census 2001). 
 
Retail managers clearly come into Warr’s category four and, significantly, it is sales 
staff whom he cites as his example of age–enhanced activity. Both our applicants had 
managerial backgrounds, and this is the most commercially-responsible job tested, so  
we interpret the preference for the older applicant as reflecting a realisation by 
employers that this is an employment where the job experience component of human 
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capital contributes significantly to performance, which may include customer 
satisfaction. We have here a rational response to age-related human capital 
differences, rather than discrimination.  
 
5. Policy: implications and recommendations 
We found net discrimination against a 39-year-old graduate of 59.6 per cent and 
against a 47-year-old waiter, in London, of 68.2 percent. In the 1960s Political and 
Economic Planning (PEP), recorded discrimination of 90.0 per cent against Indians 
and Afro-Carribeans (Daniel 1968). The finding of that level of racial discrimination, 
by PEP, gave rise to considerable concern at the time: not least in the House of 
Commons during the Committee Stage and the Second Reading of the Race Relations 
Bill in 1967/8. All three major parties (including the Conservatives, who are 
ideologically committed to laissez faire) referred, with obvious concern to PEP’s 
findings: Quentin Hogg the Conservative member for St. Marylebone (later Lord 
Hailsham, the Lord Chancellor) said, during the Committee stage; “… a great deal has 
happened in the last year. There has been the first Report of the Race Relations Board. 
There has been the PEP Report on Racial Discrimination … I tell the right hon. 
Gentleman plainly that, originally I was very critical of fresh legislation on this 
subject so soon after the last. But I was immensely impressed by the quality of some 
of the documents to which I have referred” (Parliamentary Debates 15 November 
1967). Subsequently during the Second Reading Debate he said;  “I was convinced in 
the end by the evidence of the PEP report and the Street Report…that in the fields of 
housing and employment there are circumstances in which the economic laws would 
operate in favor of discrimination and against human rights” (Parliamentary Debates 
23 April 1968). 
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It was right and proper that the British nation’s statesmen reacted so, and took 
legislative action to confront racial discrimination in 1968. It is not unreasonable to 
expect equivalent concern and reaction in 2007 in respect, not just of the elderly, but 
also of the “young seniors” (for example our waiters), and, in the case of the graduate, 
the middle-aged. They are more numerous and just as deserving of protection as the 
black community. The portents, however, are not good; the deadline for implementing 
a European Union Directive on age equality legislation, agreed in 2000, was 
December 2006; the British legislation only came into force in October 2006.  
 
An abiding mantra of British governments for the past twenty-five years has been the 
need for a “flexible labor market”. It is rarely defined, but it is demand-side flexibility 
which is always implied. One official definition is; “In a “flexible” labor market 
where employment is little regulated (in terms of pay, working hours, restrictions on 
dismissal etc.) the creation of low-paid, part-time, short-term or otherwise non-
standard jobs is unconstrained, and there is a high level of job turnover, employers 
screen less intensively before hiring” (OECD 1992, p. 207). 
 
 In the Green Paper, Simplicity, Security and Choice: Working and Saving for 
Retirement, the current British government has shown great concern for the 
demographic structure of the labor force; for instance, it estimates that the ratio of 
those 65 plus to those 15-64, will rise from 24.4 percent in 2000 to 32.8 percent in 
2025 and to 39.2 percent in 2050 (Department for Work and Pensions 2002, p. 16). As 
we saw in the Introduction, the Government considers it essential that employment 
rates of older workers rise to meet this demographic/pensions crisis. It follows that a 
government, which proselytises for demand-side labor market flexibility, and which 
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wants to encourage people to work longer, has an obligation to ensure supply-side 
flexibility for older workers, so that they are not trapped in the unemployment pool, or 
in unsatisfactory or oppressive current employment. 
 
Experimental research (e.g. McIntosh and Smith; Riach and Rich 1987, 2006) of the 
hiring process has repeatedly demonstrated the uninformative, and sometimes 
dishonest, nature of rejection letters. The pattern of dishonesty was repeated in this 
study. For example, in an application for a graduate position, the younger applicant 
was sent the following response on 11 November: 
 “Thank you for sending your CV to …. Can you call me to discuss …”.  
The older applicant was sent the following response on 19 November: 
 “I am writing to inform you that you have not been selected for a registration 
interview with … on this occasion. Unfortunately your skills and experience to date 
do not exactly match our client’s requirements at this time”.  
On another occasion the older graduate was sent the following on 7 August: 
 “… I regret to advise you we have no vacancy for a trainee chartered accountant. We 
have now filled all our training places”.  
Whereas on 12 August the younger applicant was sent:  
“Due to holiday commitments, we are unable to offer you an interview until early 
September. If this is of interest to you, please contact … to arrange an appointment”.  
 
It follows that, in most cases, a rejected applicant would not be aware that they had 
incurred discriminatory treatment and, even if they did suspect it, they would lack 
evidence to demonstrate, before a legal tribunal, a prima facie case of discrimination. 
This is acknowledged, inter alia, by the OECD; “… age discrimination legislation 
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may not be very effective since it is often easier to prove discrimination in dismissal 
than hiring” (OECD 2004, p. 99). It was also an important conclusion of Adams in his 
investigation of the impact of state age discrimination legislation in the USA. Using 
interstate data from as far back as the 1960s he concluded - “One thing is clear, 
however. There is no evidence that suggests there are positive effects for protected 
workers. The stock of older workers that are new hires did not change” (Adams 2004, 
p. 237).  It follows that this is a particularly serious problem for policy to address, 
especially in view of the rates of discrimination detected in our experiment for people 
as young as 39 and 47. Nevertheless, the British age discrimination legislation of 2006 
requires the complainant to prove facts from which the Employment Tribunal could 
conclude that the respondent has discriminated. 
 
Consequently a new approach is required and we recommend that, to strengthen the 
effectiveness of age discrimination legislation, in respect of recruitment, any equal 
opportunity, or human rights, commission should be charged to play an active, 
investigative role in the recruitment process; that is, it should have power to conduct 
random audits of hiring and personnel practices. If employers were required to keep 
all records of job applications for a period of twelve months, and obliged to justify 
decisions on short-listing for interview and final choice of candidate, in the event of 
random audit, it would create pressure for scrupulousness in the hiring decision. An 
appropriate analogy can be drawn here with the capital market. Public corporations 
have various duties with respect to reporting to shareholders, potential shareholders 
and the business community at large. They are also subject to independent financial 
audit, and they are usually required to satisfy an independent commission about 
various aspects of their financial activities. In effect, capitalist economies provide a 
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range of regulations and checks to protect the owners of financial capital against 
unscrupulous practices and guard against the waste of this resource. Therefore it 
seems entirely appropriate that similar protection be afforded the owners of human 
capital, and that steps be taken to prevent it being wasted through employers using 
screening devices, such as race, sex or age, for purposes unrelated to job performance. 
Barbara Bergmann has also advocated a similar policy (see Bergmann 1986, p. 158). 
 
A complementary recommendation is that the approach to combating age 
discrimination in recruitment should be one of affirmative action. Affirmative action 
inevitably invokes fierce controversy and opposition from the privileged group – 
usually white, middle-class, “prime-age”, protestant men.  
 
In an investigative, or audit strategy, we recommend that employers should be 
required to justify why appropriately-qualified post-40/post-50/post-60 applicants 
have not been appointed. If the proportion of post/40/50/60 appointments is less than 
(say) 66 percent of the proportion of appropriately-qualified post40/50/60 applications 
then the employer should be required to review personnel policies and an auditor 
would be involved in future selection procedures until significant improvement 
occurred. In other words we are recommending a form of affirmative action for the 
middle-aged and elderly. As Bergmann has explained - “The selection process often 
does have important subjective elements, allowing plenty of leeway for making 
mistakes as well as for decision-makers attitudes about race and gender to influence 
outcomes. Thus, it is wrong to assume that the candidate chosen in the absence of 
affirmative action is always or almost always better than all those sent away” 
(Bergmann 1986, p. 104). 
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Age-based affirmative action would not incur some of the opposition traditionally 
directed at race or sex-based affirmative action. We are only recommending that older 
applicants be given proportionate treatment in jobs which they have already been 
doing, or perhaps, at most, one step up in the hierarchy. The charge that they “only got 
the job because of their age” could not hold up: they have already demonstrated they 
have done the job. The other side of this coin is that the aged will not react, as some 
blacks and females do, in opposing affirmative action, because of their concern that it 
suggests they did not get the job on their merits. In this case their “merits” have 
previously passed muster. 
 
Another significant distinction in respect of age-based affirmative action is that, 
whereas whites never become black, and only rarely do males become female, the 
young do become old. In other words we should expect lesser hostility from the 
“majority” group, as in this case they stand to benefit in their turn. Moreover in the 
current demographic environment the alternative to ensuring a fair employment deal 
for “older” workers are increased taxes to finance the growing pension bill. 
 23
Table 1: Results for the Age Discrimination Tests  
         1 
Occupation 
        2 
Location of    
test  
     3 
Neither 
invited 
    4 
Usable      
tests 
      5 
  Equal 
treatment     
           6 
Discrimination 
against older 
           7 
Discrimination 
against younger 
           8 
         Net 
Discriminationa   
     
 Graduate 
Total (number) 
Percent 
 
 
England 
 
 
   373 
  
     
     
 
     47 
   100 
 
 
     15 
     31.9 
 
 
 
         30 
         63.8 
 
 
 
           2 
           4.3 
      
 
 
          28  
          59.6*** 
Retail Manager 
Total (number) 
Percent 
 
London  
 
 
   273 
 
 
     27 
   100 
 
       3 
     11.1 
 
           8 
         29.6 
 
         16 
         59.3 
 
          -8 
        -29.6*  
Waiter 
Total (number) 
Percent 
 
Total London (number) 
Percent 
 
Total Rest of England (number) 
Percent 
 
 
England 
 
 
London 
 
 
 
 
 
   390 
 
    80 
  100 
 
    22 
  100 
 
    58 
  100 
 
     11 
     13.8 
 
       3 
     13.6 
 
       8 
     13.7 
 
         46 
         57.5 
 
         17 
         77.3 
 
         29 
         50 
          
 
 
         23 
         28.8 
 
           2 
           9.1 
 
         21 
         36.2 
 
         23          
         28.8*** 
      
         15 
         68.2*** 
   
           8 
         13.8 
       
Note 1: Chi-squared tests were conducted on the response rates and the results are indicated in column 8 -  * significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; 
*** significant at the  0.001 level. 
a.     A negative value indicates discrimination against the younger applicant.
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Table 2: Results for the UK Sex and Race Discrimination Tests  
Occupation       Study Location of    test  Test on basis of      Net Discrimination 
              percent         
 
 
Chartered accountant 
 
 
 
Riach and Rich 
(2006) 
 
 
England 
 
 
        Sex  
 
 
 
-20.0*a
 
 
Computer analyst programmer 
 
 
 
Riach and Rich 
(2006) 
 
 
London and South 
East 
 
 
 
         Sex  
 
 
 
 -35.3**a
 
Engineer 
 
 
Riach and Rich 
(2006) 
 
London, South, 
South-East, Home 
Counties 
 
         Sex  
 
 
                23.1* 
 
 
Secretary 
 
 
 
Riach and Rich 
(2006) 
 
London 
 
         Sex  
 
 
               -43.1***a
 
 
Accountant, Electronics 
Engineer, Sales representative, 
Secretary 
 
 
Jowell and Prescott-
Clarke (1970) 
 
 
England 
 
         Race 
Asian 
West Indian 
 
                50.0*** 
                11.0 
 
 
Clerk, Sales Representative,  
Secretary, Shop assistant 
 
 
 
Hubbuck and Carter 
(1980) 
 
Nottingham 
 
         Race 
Asian 
West Indian 
 
                42.0*** 
                43.0*** 
 
 
Accountant, Clerical, 
Management Trainee, 
Salesman, Secretary 
 
 
McIntosh and Smith 
(1974) 
 
Birmingham 
London 
 
         Race 
Asian/West Indian 
 
                30.0*** 
 
 
Note  1: Chi-squared tests were conducted on the response rates and the results are indicated for net discrimination:  
          * significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *** significant at the  0.001 level. 
          a.     A negative value indicates discrimination against the male applicant. 
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Table 3: Results for the Age Discrimination Tests for Graduates, for Firms Noted as “Investors in People” 
         1 
Occupation 
        2 
Location of    test  
    3 
Usable      
tests 
 
      4 
  Equal 
treatment     
 
           5 
Discrimination 
against older 
           6 
Discrimination 
against younger 
 
           7 
         Net 
Discrimination 
 
 
Graduate 
Total (number) 
Percent 
 
 
England 
     
 
     13 
   100 
 
 
        7 
      53.9 
 
 
 
           6 
         46.2 
 
 
 
           0 
           0.0 
      
 
 
            6  
          46.2** 
Note 1: Chi-squared tests were conducted on the response rates and the results are indicated in column 8:    
             * significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level 
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                                                    Appendix 
                Two Résumés Used in Job Applications for Waiter 
 
 
                                         Résumé A 
 
                                     
Personal Profile of … 
 
Personal details 
 
  Born 13-4-1977 
 
  email   
 
 
Qualifications 
 
  GCSE - 6 Subjects two of which were English and Mathematics 
  NVQ3 in Hospitality Supervision 
  NVQ2 in Food and Drink Services 
  ‘Computer Usage and Fine Wines of the World’ studied in my course at College 
 
Employment 
 
 2001 – present: Senior Waiter at Restaurante Venezia in Tunbridge Wells. 
 
 1997- 2000: Waiter at a restaurant in Brighton, which I moved to in order to gain a   
 more responsible post, and to have experience of serving foreign food and fine wine.  
 1994 -1997: My first job was at a hotel in Brighton, where I initially served breakfast  
 and afternoon tea, but was soon promoted to serving lunch and dinner. 
 
 
Sporting and cultural interests 
 
 Mountain-biking and films. 
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                                                     RÉSUMÉ B  
 
 RÉSUMÉ OF ……. 
 
ADDRESS       
 
EMAIL             
 
AGE                47 
 
EDUCATION  
5 “O” levels (including English and Maths)  
Evening classes at College - including food service, wine appreciation, 
restaurant management and computer skills.  
NVQ2 in Food and Drink Services and NVQ3 in Restaurant 
Supervision. 
 
EXPERIENCE 
After leaving school I had a variety of jobs such as coffee shop server and barman. 
I became a waiter in 1988 and since then have had a variety of jobs in hotels and 
restaurants, serving English, French, Italian and Spanish food. I began in hotels in 
Torquay, Bath and Burford. My duties included, preparing the dining room and 
serving breakfast, lunch and dinner. I also helped with room service. Subsequently 
I moved to more senior and responsible jobs in restaurants in London, Oxford and 
Stratford-upon-Avon, serving food and wine. For the last three years I have been 
employed at “Claudettes” in Guilford as Deputy Head Waiter. 
 
INTERESTS 
I play competitive Squash and I enjoy restoring classic motor cycles. Also I enjoy 
using the internet. 
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